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THE  RESURRECTION  OF  THE  “SINGLE  SCHEME”
EXCLUSION  TO  RICO’S  PATTERN
REQUIREMENT
Kevin J. Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) as Title IX of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act.1  RICO was designed primarily to “eliminat[e] . . . the infiltra-
tion of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce.”2  But, the language
of RICO was written broadly enough to reach “both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises.”3  Congress believed that RICO would effec-
tively “strengthen[ ] the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies”4 to combat “enterprise criminality.”5
Congress provided for both criminal6 and civil7 liability under RICO
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.S.
in Accounting and Finance, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, 2011.  I
would like to thank Professor G. Robert Blakey for his inspiration of this Note’s topic
and invaluable guidance throughout the process, my family and friends for their
constant love and support, and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for being
great editors and even better company.
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961–1968 (2006)).
2 S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969). For a comprehensive discussion and analysis
of the legislative history of RICO, see G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249–80 (1982).
3 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578 (1981); cf. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) (“The occasion for Congress’ action was the perceived
need to combat organized crime.  But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a
more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not
limited in application to organized crime.”).
4 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
5 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted).
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).  The criminal provisions authorize penalties in the
form of imprisonment, fines, and criminal forfeiture. Id.
1991
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for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, which, stated simply,8 makes it
unlawful for a person to:
(a) use or invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity to acquire, establish, or operate an enterprise;9
(b) acquire or maintain any interest in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity;10
(c) conduct or participate in the conduct of an enterprise’s
affairs though a pattern of racketeering activity;11
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.  The “far-reaching civil enforcement scheme” of § 1964
includes a provision for private suits and remedies in the form of injunctions, treble
damages, and counsel’s fees.  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 483 (1985).
8 These simplified provisions omit that RICO may be violated through a “collec-
tion of an unlawful debt.”  18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c).  The collection of an unlawful
debt cannot be an “isolated transaction,” but it need not be a part of a pattern. See
Wright v. Shephard, 919 F.2d 665, 673 (11th Cir. 1990).  Additionally, the simplified
statement omits the requirement of an effect on “interstate or foreign commerce.”
Even a slight impact on interstate commerce suffices. See United States v. Bagnariol,
665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The effect on commerce is an essential element of
a RICO violation, but the required nexus need not be great.  A minimal effect on
interstate commerce satisfies this jurisdictional element.”).
9 It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a princi-
pal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.  A purchase of securities on the open mar-
ket for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or
participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so,
shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
10 “It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
11 It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
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(d) conspire to violate any of these provisions.12
Crucial to proving a violation of RICO is a showing that the
defendant engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.”  The phrase
is used in all four sections of § 1962, and applies on both the criminal
and civil sides of the statute.  But the meaning of “pattern of racke-
teering activity” has proven particularly elusive, as its bounds are espe-
cially difficult to delineate.  In the text of RICO, Congress merely
placed a floor on what acts could constitute a “pattern of racketeering
activity,” requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten
years of one another.13
The question of whether two acts within ten years could be neces-
sary but not sufficient to form a pattern of racketeering activity laid
largely dormant14 until the Court took up Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec-
tion of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
12 “It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”  18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
13 “[A] ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).  The
Supreme Court described the statute as placing “an outer limit on the concept of a
pattern of racketeering activity that is broad indeed.”  H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989).
14 See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 255 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The major-
ity of pre-Sedima decisions . . . concluded that a ‘pattern’ of racketeering activity could
be proved simply by showing the commission of two acts of ‘racketeering activity’
within the last ten years . . . .” (citing Alexander Grant v. Tiffany, 742 F.2d 408, 410
(8th Cir. 1984), United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), and United
States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974))). But see Exeter Towers Assocs. v. Bow-
ditch, 604 F. Supp. 1547, 1554 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding that two or more acts of mail
fraud are insufficient for a pattern and noting that a holding to the contrary would
give RICO “a sweep so broad as to be inconsistent with manifested congressional
objectives”); Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 13 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (holding that alleged acceptance of several bribes during one political fun-
draiser is not sufficient to form a pattern).
Several other courts prior to Sedima suggested that more than two acts in ten
years might be required for a RICO pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Moeller, 402 F.
Supp. 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975) (noting in dicta that the “common sense interpretation
of the word ‘pattern’ implies . . . episodes that are at least somewhat separated in time
and place yet still sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of activ-
ity” (emphasis added)); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(construing the word “pattern” to “include[e] a requirement that the racketeering
acts must have been connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or
motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts”
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Co.15 in 1984.  In footnote 14, in dicta, the Court famously recognized
that two racketeering acts within ten years of one another may be
insufficient to form a RICO pattern and that it is the “continuity plus
relationship” of acts of racketeering that forms a pattern.16  The Court
stated that “[t]he legislative history [of RICO] supports the view that
two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern.”17
Finally, the Court quoted the definition of “pattern” from a section of
the 1970 Act in pari materia: “criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.”18
Relying on the legal material set out in this footnote, the circuit
courts quickly developed widely varying and inconsistent views of the
“pattern” requirement.19  Several of the circuits held that the pres-
ence of “multiple schemes” assisted in proving the “continuity”
prong.20  The Eighth Circuit held that a single scheme could never be
sufficient to satisfy the continuity element.21  As the circuits’
approaches grew further in tension with one another, the Supreme
Court took up a case from the Eighth Circuit, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.22 H.J. Inc. set out to clarify the disarray on the “pat-
tern” requirement and bring consistency to the circuits.  The Court
explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s requirement of “multiple
(emphasis added)).  These two concepts, “episode” and “scheme,” represent themes
in tension in early RICO pattern decisions.
15 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
16 Id. at 496 n.14 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 (1969)).  The Court in
Sedima addressed two limitations to RICO’s civil liability provisions that the Second
Circuit had imposed.  First, the Court held that the statute required no distinct “rack-
eteering injury” separate from the injury occurring as a result of the predicate acts.
Id. at 494.  Second, it dispensed with the rule that civil RICO actions could only pro-
ceed after a criminal conviction. Id. at 488.  For an explanation of why the criminal
conviction requirement is inconsistent with RICO’s legislative history and analogous
civil actions, see Leigh Ann MacKenzie, Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and
Burden of Proof, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 566, 569 (1985).
17 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
18 Id. (citing Organized Crime Control Act, title X, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922, 948
(repealed 1987)).
19 See infra Part I.
20 See infra notes 31–40. R
21 See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987) (“A single
fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient.”), rev’d, 492 U.S. 229 (1989); see also Supe-
rior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding one isolated scheme
insufficient to form a pattern under RICO).
22 492 U.S. 229 (1989). See infra Part II.
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schemes”23 for a pattern to be present and provided a framework for
analyzing whether a pattern was present.24  It is the last word on
RICO’s “pattern” from the Court.
This Note will argue that the “single scheme” exclusion (also
referred to throughout this Note as the “multiple scheme require-
ment”) to RICO explicitly rejected by the Court in H.J. Inc. has
improperly been resurrected.  Part I of the Note will discuss the vary-
ing approaches used by the circuits prior to the Court’s ruling in H.J.
Inc., describing the degree of emphasis that different circuits placed
on the presence of multiple schemes.  Part II will describe the Court’s
rejection of the Eighth Circuit’s “single scheme” exclusion and
describe the framework for analysis of RICO’s pattern element the
Court set out in H.J. Inc.  Finally, Part III will discuss the re-imposition
of the “single scheme” exclusion by many lower courts after H.J. Inc.
and argue that several cases contravene the letter and spirit of H.J.
Inc., are inconsistent with a commonsense understanding of the word
“pattern,” yield impractical results, and add more unnecessary confu-
sion to an already murky pattern analysis.  Part III will then recom-
mend the jettison of the “single scheme” exclusion and suggest
alternative measures that could ameliorate persistent differences over
the meaning of RICO’s “pattern of racketeering activity.”
I. “A KALEIDOSCOPE OF CIRCUIT POSITIONS”
In Sedima, the Court expressed discontent about the “‘extraordi-
nary’ uses to which civil RICO had been put,” attributing it to “the
failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
‘pattern.’”25  With this invitation to develop a principled limitation to
an arguably errant statute, the lower courts set out to rectify the
problem.
Unfortunately, the gentle guidance that the Court gave as to the
meaning of a “pattern of racketeering activity” in Sedima led to several
divergent approaches in the courts of appeals,26 provoking Justice
23 Id. at 240–41.  This will be referred to throughout the Note as either the “mul-
tiple schemes requirement” or the “single scheme’ exclusion.
24 Id. at 241–43.
25 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
26 See generally G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil
RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be
Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 535 n.37 (1987)
(discussing the interpretation of “pattern” post-Sedima and rejecting all exclusions
based on “single schemes”); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and “Pattern:” The Search for
“Continuity Plus Relationship,” 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971 (1988) (discussing and analyz-
ing the circuit courts’ interpretation of RICO’s pattern requirement after Sedima);
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Scalia later to describe the phenomenon as “a kaleidoscope of Circuit
positions.”27  At the least restrictive end of the spectrum, several
courts found that the “pattern” element was satisfied when the explicit
statutory language was met, treating two acts of racketeering as suffi-
cient.28  Nearly as permissive was the test employed by the Fifth29 and
Eleventh Circuits,30 which required only that the two or more racke-
teering activities be related.  These circuits did not discuss whether
the activities in question needed to be continuous in nature.
Lisa A. Huestis, Commentary, RICO: The Meaning of “Pattern” Since Sedima, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 621, 631–44 (1988) (discussing RICO “pattern” cases after Sedima); Lisa Bar-
soomian, Comment, RICO “Pattern” Before and After H.J. Inc.: A Proposed Definition, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 919, 925–30 (1991); Kim Cafaro Murphy, Note, Reconsideration of Pat-
tern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 88–93 (1986); Ethan M. Posner,
Note, Clarifying a “Pattern” of Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO’s Pattern
Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1745, 1754–60 (1988).
27 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  Justice Scalia
also described the chaos after Sedima as “the widest and most persistent Circuit split
on an issue of federal law in recent memory.” Id. at 251.  The pervasiveness of disa-
greement in the circuit courts was not lost on the H.J. Inc. majority, who noted that
the “plethora of different views expressed . . . demonstrates . . . [that] developing a
meaningful concept of ‘pattern’ within the existing statutory framework has proved to
be no easy task.” Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[I]f two
distinct statutory violations are found, the predicate acts requirement is ful-
filled . . . .”); United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986) (treating the
Supreme Court’s discussion of the pattern element in Sedima as purely dicta and find-
ing that two acts did form a pattern).  The Second Circuit in Ianniello and Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987), found that any necessary
relationship and continuity requirements were inherent to RICO’s “enterprise” ele-
ment, not “pattern.” See Huestis, supra note 26, at 636–44 (discussing this analysis and R
its resistance in the district courts).
29 See, e.g., R.A.G.S Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that two related acts of mail fraud were sufficient and noting that Sedima
only implied that two isolated events did not constitute a pattern); Montesano v.
Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 425–26 (5th Cir. 1987) (adhering to
R.A.G.S.’s test of whether the acts are related, but urging the Circuit to review the
case en banc); Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1280–81 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding numerous acts of mail
fraud to be sufficient under the Circuit’s current standard but recognizing that the
Court in Sedima “appeared to challenge the lower courts to develop a more rigorous
interpretation of ‘pattern’”).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 797 F.2d 943, 951–52 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that kidnapping and murdering the same victim constituted a pattern
because the crimes were related and not isolated); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav.
Ass’n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a require-
ment of “multiple schemes” for a pattern and holding that the activities must be
related and not isolated).
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At the opposite end of the spectrum lay the Eighth Circuit’s com-
parably restrictive analysis, which held that “[a] single fraudulent
effort or scheme is insufficient” to establish a pattern.31  In support of
its single scheme exclusion, the Eighth Circuit argued that “[i]t places
a real strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort,
implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a ‘pattern of racketeering
activity.’”32  Though several courts of appeals considered the exis-
tence of “multiple schemes” as a factor in searching for a pattern,
most rejected it as a requirement.33
The remainder of the circuit courts attempted to “steer[ ] a mid-
dle course between these two extremes,”34 though even this attempt
yielded discordant results.  When courts did distinctly consider the
relationship and continuity prongs, they generally had much more
difficulty analyzing the continuity element.35  However, many courts
had trouble conceptually separating the relatedness and continuity
31 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987), rev’d, 492 U.S.
229 (1988).
32 Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting N.
Trust Bank/O’Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).
Northern Trust Bank was the architect of the requirement of multiple schemes for a
pattern to be present.  The judge strove to put into action what he saw as the “mes-
sage” of Sedima: “[l]ower courts concerned about RICO’s expansive potential would
best be advised to focus on the hitherto largely ignored ‘pattern’ concept.”  615 F.
Supp. at 832.  The opinion is difficult analytically to understand, as it simultaneously
introduces the concepts of a “single fraudulent effort,” “single criminal episode,” “sin-
gle criminal transaction,” and “single scheme” into the pattern analysis. Id. at 831–33.
Ironically, the opinion itself foreshadowed the inherently contradictory nature of
requiring multiple schemes for a pattern to be present, recognizing that several
courts of appeals have determined that a pattern requires that the acts be “connected
with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive . . . .” Id. at 831 (quoting
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)) (emphasis added); see
infra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining how the single scheme exclusion R
effectively excludes all cases from RICO, as a single scheme of racketeering activity
fails on the continuity prong and multiple schemes fail on the relatedness prong).
33 See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 235 n.2 (listing cases which explicitly rejected the “mul-
tiple scheme” requirement in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits). Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986),
articulated the most common indictment of the “multiple scheme” requirement:
“[D]efendants who commit a large and ongoing scheme, albeit a single scheme,
would automatically escape RICO liability for their actions, an untenable result.”
34 Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975.
35 See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928–29 (10th Cir. 1987)
(quickly dispensing with the “relationship” element then finding that a single scheme
absent a threat of continuity is insufficient).
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components36 and examined the elements together in multi-factor
tests.  For example, the Third Circuit looked to “a combination of spe-
cific factors such as the number of unlawful acts, the length of time
over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the
number of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the character of
the unlawful activity.”37
The Seventh Circuit performed a similar multi-factored analysis,
but also considered whether the acts were part of “separate schemes”
and whether “distinct injuries” were present.38  The Seventh Circuit
imposed the additional requirement that the acts formed “separate
transactions.”39  Other Seventh Circuit cases considered whether the
alleged acts formed multiple criminal “episodes.”40
Between analysis of patterns, acts, schemes, transactions, and epi-
sodes, the lower courts seemed content to trade out one vague term
for another.41  Amidst this confusion, the Court granted certiorari in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.42 and sought to put the differ-
ences to rest.
II. H.J. INC.
In H.J. Inc., a class of customers of Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co. filed a civil RICO claim against Northwestern Bell, its officers and
employees, and various members of the Minnesota Public Utilities
36 This is not so much a problem as it is an inescapable feature of the “relation-
ship plus continuity” analysis.  The Court in H.J. Inc. recognized this, stating that
though “these two constituents of RICO’s pattern requirement must be stated sepa-
rately . . . in practice their proof will often overlap.”  492 U.S. at 239.
37 Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.
1987); see also Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d
1263, 1267 (3d Cir. 1987) (looking to whether the acts had “the same or similar
results, participants, victims, methods of commission, or other interrelationships”).
38 See Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975 (“Relevant factors include the number and variety
of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed, the number
of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries.”);
see also Med. Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Foulke, 844 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1988)
(applying the test set forth in Morgan).
39 Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975.
40 See, e.g., Medallian TV Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290,
1296 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (requiring “different criminal episodes in order to show con-
tinuity of racketeering activity”); Fleet Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
627 F. Supp. 550, 559 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (requiring “at least two criminal episodes”).
41 See Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.3d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (“An episode is
apparently something more than an act of racketeering activity but something less
than a scheme.”).
42 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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Commission (MPUC).43  The complaint alleged that from 1980 to
1986, Northwestern Bell sought to influence members of the MPUC
in the performance of their duties through cash payments to commis-
sioners, negotiations of future employment, and payments for meals,
parties, and sporting events tickets.  The complaint alleged that these
bribes led the MPUC to approve excessive rates for the company, to
the detriment of its customers.44
The District Court for the District of Minnesota granted North-
western Bell’s motion to dismiss the RICO claim, finding that under
Superior Oil the fraudulent acts alleged were part of a “single scheme
to influence MPUC commissioners.”45  The Eighth Circuit affirmed,
finding that “[a] single fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient” to
establish a pattern of racketeering activity.46
The Supreme Court started by acknowledging that since Sedima,
Congress “ha[d] done nothing . . . to illuminate RICO’s key require-
ment of a pattern of racketeering” and recognizing that “developing a
meaningful concept of ‘pattern’ within the existing statutory frame-
work has proved to be no easy task” for the lower courts.47
The Court’s interpretation of the “pattern” element began by
explicitly rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s rule that only multiple illegal
schemes can constitute a pattern.48  The Court noted that “although
43 Id. at 233.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 234 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 425 (D.
Minn. 1986)).  The District Court held that dismissal was mandated by Superior Oil Co.
v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (1986), which the District Court recognized to have created an
“extremely restrictive” test for the pattern of racketeering activity element.  648 F.
Supp. at 425.
46 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987), rev’d, 492 U.S.
229 (1989).
47 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236.
48 Id.  The Court also rejected the notion that the “pattern” element has inherent
in it a requirement that the predicate acts are related to organized crime. Id. at
236–37.  The Court further elaborated on its rejection of the organized crime limita-
tion by saying that it “finds no support in the Act’s text, and is at odds with the tenor
of its legislative history.” Id. at 244.
 Since RICO’s rise in popularity in civil suits, it has withstood several similar
efforts at judicially-imposed limitations not rooted in the text of the statute. See, e.g.,
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 660 (2008) (“We have repeatedly
refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a
preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe.”); Nat’l Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994) (holding that a RICO violation
does not require an “economic motive”); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
493–94 (1985) (rejecting the requirement that civil RICO can only proceed against a
defendant who already has a criminal conviction and rejecting the requirement of a
“racketeering injury,” relying heavily on the plain language of RICO’s text in both
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proof that a RICO defendant has been involved in multiple criminal
schemes would certainly be highly relevant to the inquiry into the con-
tinuity of the defendant’s racketeering activity, it is implausible to sup-
pose that Congress thought continuity might be shown only by proof
of multiple schemes.”49  The Court believed that “Congress had a
more natural and commonsense approach to RICO’s pattern element
in mind” when it drafted RICO.50
In developing its commonsense approach, the Court began with
RICO’s text.  It first reaffirmed that the statutory requirement for a
pattern, which states that a pattern “requires at least two acts of racke-
teering activity,” merely places a floor on what might be required for a
pattern.51  The Court interpreted this provision to imply that “while
instances); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981) (rejecting a con-
struction of RICO which would limit its application to only “legitimate enterprises”
and noting that this construction “clearly departed from .  .  . the statutory language
[of § 1964(4)]”); see also Blakey & Cessar, supra note 26, at 533–34 (describing the R
“extreme hostility” from the district courts that greeted civil RICO’s rise in popularity
and analyzing their attempts to “redraft the statute in a concerted effort to dismiss
civil suits in all possible ways”).
49 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.
50 Id. at 237.
51 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006)) (emphasis added).  Though the legis-
lative history does unambiguously support this reading, it does not inexorably flow
from the text of § 1961(5).  Arguably, the most natural reading is that the phrase
“requires at least two acts of racketeering” means “requires two or more acts of racke-
teering activity.”  Take, for example, this sentence as a semantic fact: “A Smorgasbord
requires at least six types of food.”  It would be strange, indeed, for a man to arrive at a
Smorgasbord, see that it has only six types of food, and proclaim in disgust, “This is no
Smorgasbord!  I see only six types of food.  This is but a spread!”
Another analogy can be drawn from 33 U.S.C. § 2327, which lays out the defini-
tion of “rehabilitation” for inland waterway projects.  The statute declares that the
term “rehabilitation” requires, inter alia, “[a] major project feature restoration . . .
which is initially funded before October 1, 1994, and will require at least $5,000,000 in
capital outlays . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 2327 (2006) (emphasis added).  To say that a major
project feature restoration that met all of the statute’s other requirements, was ini-
tially funded in 1990, and would require $5,000,000 in capital outlays is not a “rehabil-
itation” for the purpose of the statute would seriously strain the English language.  If
RICO’s definition of a “pattern” was interpreted similarly, establishing merely two acts
of racketeering activity would be sufficient for a pattern.
The Court’s interpretation of § 1961(5) would be the most natural reading if the
language of the provision were slightly altered to read, “pattern of racketeering activ-
ity at least requires two acts of racketeering activity.”  If this were the language, room
would be left for the notion that two acts may not be entirely sufficient.  To continue
with the prior analogy, take as factual the sentence: “A Smorgasbord at least requires six
types of food.”  In this instance, it would be decidedly less strange for someone to
declare a layout of six foods not a Smorgasbord.  However, looking at RICO from
anything other than a purely textualist perspective would lead to the conclusion that
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two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.”52  After exploring
the ordinary meaning of “pattern” in the English language, the Court
concluded that Congress intended to take a “flexible approach” in
defining pattern.53
In turning its attention to RICO’s legislative history, the Court
found that a pattern is not formed by “sporadic activity” and that “two
widely separated and isolated criminal offenses” do not establish a
RICO violation.54  Enshrining Sedima’s basic framework into prece-
dential law, the Court held that it is “continuity plus relationship which
combine[ ] to produce a pattern.”55  Clarifying this further, the Court
established two separate requirements for a showing of “pattern”: (1)
relatedness—that “the racketeering predicates are related;” and (2)
continuity—that these predicates “amount to or pose a threat of con-
tinued criminal activity.”56
Though the Court acknowledged that the evidence of these
prongs would inevitably overlap to some extent, it emphasized that
they are “distinct requirements.”57  Explaining the relatedness prong
first, the Court stated that the predicate acts must “have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis-
sion, or otherwise [be] interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and [not be] isolated events.”58
two acts alone are not sufficient, as Senator McClellan’s comments in the Congres-
sional Record indicate. See 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (stating that a person can-
not be subjected to RICO liability “simply for committing two widely separated and
isolated criminal offenses”).
Furthermore, as Justice Scalia observed in his concurring opinion, if two acts
were sufficient for RICO liability to attach, the word “pattern” would not have been
necessary, as “multiple acts” of racketeering activity would have sufficed. H.J. Inc., 492
U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  So “pattern” does connote some-
thing beyond two acts of racketeering activity, even if the definitional provisions in
§ 1961(5) do not entirely address what that something is.
52 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14).
53 Id. at 238.
54 Id. at 239 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91–617, at 158 (1969); 116 CONG. REC. 18,940
(1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan)).
55 Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan)).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 242.
58 Id. at 240 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act, title X, § 1001(a), 84 Stat.
922, 948 (repealed 1987)).  Justice Scalia (along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy, concurring in judgment) took serious issue with the
Court’s use of a separate provision of the same bill in determining meaning:
[The Court’s] definition has the feel of being solidly rooted in law, since it is
a direct quotation of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e).  Unfortunately, if normal (and
sensible) rules of statutory construction were followed, the existence of
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Providing a functional definition of “continuity” was not as simple
an exercise.  Further elaborating on its rejection of the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s requirement of multiple schemes, the Court found that the
term “scheme” “appear[ed] nowhere in the language or legislative his-
tory of the Act.”59  It further critiqued the multiple scheme approach
by noting that it did not have the advantage of ameliorating the confu-
sion surrounding RICO’s pattern requirement, as “ ‘scheme’ is hardly
a self-defining term.”60  The Court’s criticism of the concept of a
“scheme” did not stop there, as it explained:
A “scheme” is in the eye of the beholder, since whether a
scheme exists depends on the level of generality at which criminal
activity is viewed. . . . There is no obviously “correct” level of general-
ity for courts to use in describing the criminal activity alleged in
RICO litigation.  Because of this problem of generalizability, the
Eighth Circuit’s “scheme” concept is highly elastic.  Though the def-
initional problems that arise in interpreting RICO’s pattern require-
ment inevitably lead to uncertainty regarding the statute’s scope—
whatever approach is adopted—we prefer to confront these
problems directly, not by introducing a new and perhaps more
amorphous concept into the analysis . . . .61
The Court instead looked for a meaning “derive[d] from a com-
monsense, everyday understanding of RICO’s language and Congress’
§ 3575(e)—which is the definition contained in another title of the Act that
was explicitly not rendered applicable to RICO—suggests that whatever “pat-
tern” might mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean that.  “[W]here Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).  Though Justice Scalia rejected the doctrine of in pari materia in
interpreting RICO, the Court has recently embraced this type of analysis. See Carls-
bad Tech., Inc., v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1865–66 (2009); see also C&T Assoc.,
Inc. v. Govt. of New Castle Cnty., 408 A.2d 27, 29 (Del. Ch. 1979) (“In construing
statutory language courts should relate words in question to associated words and
phrases in the statutory context. . . . The import of any word or phrase is to be
gleaned from the context and statutes in Pari materia, and statutes upon cognate
subjects . . . .”).
59 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241 (majority opinion).
60 Id. at 241 n.3 (citing Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832
F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987)).
61 Id. (quoting Barticheck, 832 F.3d at 39) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Justice Scalia interpreted the Court’s discussion of multiple schemes as a rejection of
the concept “not merely as the exclusive touchstone of RICO liability, but in all its
applications .  .  .  .” Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  The lower
courts disagreed on whether that was the case. See infra note 91.
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gloss on it.”62  The Court outlined two separate ways of establishing
continuity: (1) closed-ended continuity—“a closed period of repeated
conduct;” and (2) open-ended continuity—“past conduct that by its
nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.”63  Con-
tinuity could be established by proving that either closed-ended con-
tinuity or open-ended continuity was present.  Continuity, in both
cases, the Court stated, was “centrally a temporal concept.”64
Closed-ended continuity may be proven by demonstrating “a
series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of
time.”65  The Court declared that “[p]redicate acts extending over a
few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do
not satisfy this requirement,” because Congress’s concern in RICO was
long-term criminal conduct.66
Open-ended continuity, on the other hand, could be present
before closed-ended continuity could be established.  Whether open-
ended continuity exists “depends on the specific facts of each case,”67
the Court explained.  “Without making any claim to cover the field of
possibilities,” the Court presented three examples of how this “open-
ended continuity” could be proven: (1) “if the related predicates
themselves involve a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity,
either implicit or explicit;”68 (2) if the predicate acts are part of the
62 Id. at 241.
63 Id. (citing Barticheck v. Fid. Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d
Cir. 1987)).
64 Id. at 230.
65 Id.  Justice Scalia was sharply critical of this “substantial period of time”
requirement for closed-ended continuity:
I think [the majority opinion] must be saying that at least a few months of
racketeering activity (and who knows how much more?) is generally for free,
as far as RICO is concerned.  The “closed period” concept is sort of a safe
harbor for racketeering activity that does not last too long, no matter how
many different schemes are involved, so long as it does not otherwise “estab-
lish a threat of continued racketeering activity.”
Id. at 254 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
66 Id. at 242 (majority opinion).
67 Id.
68 Id.  The Court presented a concrete example:
Suppose a hoodlum were to sell “insurance” to a neighborhood’s storekeep-
ers to cover them against breakage of their windows, telling his victims he
would be reappearing each month to collect the “premium” that would con-
tinue their “coverage.”  Though the number of related predicates involved
may be small and they may occur close together in time, the racketeering
acts themselves include a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely
into the future, and thus supply the requisite threat of continuity.
Id.
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“regular way of doing business” of a “long-term association that exists
for criminal purposes;”69 or (3) if the predicates are “a regular way of
conducting the defendant’s ongoing legitimate business” or RICO
enterprise.70
The Court, foreseeing the difficulties that applying its holding
might create, admitted that the relatedness and continuity prongs
“cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that it will always be
apparent whether in a particular case a ‘pattern of racketeering activ-
ity’ exists.”71  It acknowledged that “[t]he development of these con-
cepts must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress to revisit
RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the Act’s intended scope.”72
Applying the newly-created standard to the facts of H.J. Inc., the
Court found that dismissal was improperly granted.  The numerous
bribes across a six-year period to five members of the MPUC were suf-
ficiently “related” because they were in pursuit of a common pur-
pose—to influence the commissioners to allow the defendants to
charge excessive rates.73  Because the petitioners contended that the
events occurred with some frequency across six years, the Court found
that closed-ended continuity was sufficiently alleged.  The Court also
noted that had the bribes been shown to be a regular way of con-
ducting Northwestern Bell’s business, or a regular way of conducting
the MPUC as a RICO enterprise, then open-ended continuity would
have been properly alleged as well.74  The case was reversed and
remanded.
Justice Scalia found the Court’s direction to look to continuity
plus relationship to be as unclear of guidance as “life is a fountain.”75
After criticizing the Court’s use of legislative history76 and its “murky
discussion” in attempting to define continuity,77 Justice Scalia (joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy)78
in his concurring opinion admitted that his critiques might be unfair,
69 Id. at 242–43.
70 Id. at 243.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 250.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
76 See supra note 58.
77 See supra note 65.
78 Speculation is abroad that Justice Scalia was originally assigned to write the
majority opinion, but was unable to garner or keep his four other votes.  G. Robert
Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO
and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the End of RICO?”, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 851, 962 n.344 (1990) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Broad Use of RICO Is Upheld,
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because he found it impossible to provide an interpretation to RICO
that gave any further guidance as to its application.79  He found this
particularly disturbing because civil RICO suits had “‘quite simply rev-
olutionize[d] private litigation’ and ‘validate[d] the federalization of
broad areas of state common law of frauds.’”80  He noted that RICO’s
criminal dimensions, to which § 1962’s “pattern” requirement also
applied, call for the same degree of certainty expected in criminal law.
Finally, he cautioned that the Court’s inability to derive “anything
more than today’s meager guidance” on RICO “bodes ill for the day
when [a constitutional] challenge is presented.”81
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, along with Justices Rehnquist,
O’Connor, and Kennedy, did agree that the Eighth Circuit’s “single
scheme” exclusion from RICO was improper.  “[T]he Court is correct
in saying that nothing in [RICO] supports the proposition that predi-
cate acts constituting part of a single scheme (or single episode) can
never support a cause of action under RICO.”82  Thus, all nine of the
Justices of the Court agreed that single schemes of racketeering activ-
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/27/busi-
ness/broad-use-of-rico-is-upheld.html).
79 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 254–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
80 Id. at 255 (quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985)).
81 Id. at 256.  Justice Scalia’s invitation for a constitutional challenge to RICO’s
pattern requirement spurred a wave of commentary. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, Is
“Pattern” Void for Vagueness?, CIV. RICO REP. 6, Dec. 12, 1989; Blakey & Perry, supra
note 78, at 962 n.344 (“It is not possible to violate RICO without first violating one of
its predicate offenses, not once, but at least twice.  The line between guilt and inno-
cence, which is at the heart of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, is drawn under RICO
at the point of the predicate offense.”); Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, “Mother of
Mercy—Is This the End of RICO?”—Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness
Challenge to RICO “Pattern”, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106, 1164 (1990) (“Attempts to
label RICO pattern void-for-vagueness should be rejected.”); David W. Garstenstein &
Joseph F. Warganz, Note, RICO’s “Pattern” Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 489, 489 (1990) (arguing that RICO’s requirement is not void for vagueness
and that judicial interpretation of ‘pattern’ is “consistent and sufficiently predictable
to render the statute constitutional despite its extraordinary breadth”); Christopher J.
Moran, Comment, Is the “Darling” in Danger?  “Void for Vagueness”—The Constitutionality
of the RICO Pattern Requirement, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1697, 1703 (1991) (predicting that the
Court will eventually take up the issue and conclude that RICO’s pattern requirement
is not void for vagueness in the criminal or civil context).
 Ironically, earlier in the same term as H.J. Inc., the Court addressed whether
Indiana’s RICO analog statute was void for vagueness as applied to obscenity predi-
cate offenses in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).  The Court con-
cluded that it was not, finding that because the RICO statute “totally encompasses the
obscenity law, if the latter is not unconstitutionally vague, the former cannot be vague
either.” Id. at 58.
82 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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ity could establish a RICO violation, and that the Eight Circuit’s multi-
ple scheme requirement was invalid.
III. THE REVIVAL OF THE “SINGLE SCHEME” EXCLUSION
Since H.J. Inc., the courts have had relatively little difficulty in
applying the “relationship” prong of the pattern analysis.  The large
majority of courts look directly to the guidance of H.J. Inc. and deter-
mine whether the predicate acts “have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.”83
However, the same cannot be said for the continuity prong of
H.J. Inc., where the lower courts’ approaches remain in disarray.  Most
of the differences can be attributed to the “flexible approach”84 that
the Court adopted in H.J. Inc.  For example, courts are still in conflict
about what factors are relevant to establishing closed-ended con-
tinuity85 and what period of time is “substantial” enough to satisfy the
83 See Colman D. McCarthy, Note, Criminal Relationships: Vertical and Horizontal
Relatedness in Criminal RICO, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1493, 1507–08 & n.103 (2009) (not-
ing that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits perform this analysis and citing cases); see also United States v. Knight, 659
F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that “unsurprisingly, most jurisdictions
adopt the H.J. Inc. language” on relatedness and citing cases from the First, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits).  The Second Circuit requires both “horizontal relatedness” (relation
of the acts to one another) and “vertical relatedness” (relation of the acts to the enter-
prise), which in practice regularly overlap. See United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d
371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he requirements of horizontal relatedness can be estab-
lished by linking each predicate to the enterprise, although the same or similar proof
may also establish vertical relatedness.”); see also United States v. Basciano, 599 F.3d
184, 202 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[P]redicate acts must be related, both to each other (hori-
zontal relatedness) and to the enterprise (vertical relatedness) . . . .”).  The Third and
Sixth Circuits also allow the relationship between predicate acts to be proven through
a showing of relation to the enterprise. See United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 292
n.7 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 795 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A partic-
ular defendant’s predicate acts are not required to be interrelated with each other;
instead, the predicate acts must be connected to the affairs of the criminal enter-
prise.” (citing United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 2008))).
84 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238.
85 A majority of the circuits employ the explicit language of the Court in H.J. Inc.,
simply looking for the presence of “a series of related predicates extending over a
substantial period of time.” See, e.g., United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 267 (3d
Cir. 2011); U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2010); Brown v. Cassens
Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2008); Craig Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Viacom
Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001, 1028 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL405.txt unknown Seq: 17 22-APR-13 11:09
2013] resurrection  of  s ingle  scheme  exclusion  to  rico 2007
closed-ended standard.86  Given the general nature of the Court’s gui-
dance, it is understandable that these differences persist.  The Court
1229, 1259 (11th Cir. 2007); Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007);
Giuliano v. Fulton, 399 F.3d 381, 387 (1st Cir. 2005); Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219,
1229 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Tenth Circuit applies the Court’s test but focuses primarily on the duration
and extensiveness of racketeering activity. See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1268
(10th Cir. 2006) (“To determine continuity we examine both the duration of the
related predicate acts and the extensiveness of the RICO enterprise’s scheme.”); see
also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1543–44 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“Under the rubric of ‘extensiveness,’ we consider a number of factors: the number of
victims, the number of racketeering acts, the variety of racketeering acts, whether the
injuries were distinct, the complexity and size of the scheme, and the nature of the
enterprise or unlawful activity.” (citations omitted)).
The Seventh Circuit continues to apply its multi-factor test from pre-H.J. Inc.
when assessing continuity. See Jennings v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466, 473
(7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n determining whether there is continuity, ‘[r]elevant factors
include the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which
they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and
the occurrence of distinct injuries.’” (quoting Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d
970, 976 (7th Cir. 1986))).  Additionally, they impose upon the closed-ended con-
tinuity analysis the requirement that criminal activity “carries with it an implicit threat
of continued criminal activity,” conflating the two prongs created by the Court in H.J.
Inc. Id. at 473 (quoting Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1022–23 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
In its most recent full discussion of the continuity prong, the D.C. Circuit applied
a multi-factor test and gave great weight to the absence of multiple schemes. See W.
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 633–37 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(affirming dismissal of an eight-year-long scheme of racketeering activity because the
plaintiff only alleged “a single scheme, a single injury, and few victims” (citing
Edmonson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265 (D.C. Cir.
1995))).  See infra notes 96–119 for a greater analysis of the “single scheme” exclu-
sion in the D.C. Circuit.
86 Contradictory findings for schemes of similar lengths of time have littered the
RICO environment since H.J. Inc. Compare Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consul-
tants, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1525, 1533 (D. Or. 1990) (holding that the closed-ended
continuity requirement was satisfied by seven months of racketeering activity), with
Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 739 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (E.D. La. 1990) (find-
ing that ten months of mail and wire frauds did not satisfy the closed-ended con-
tinuity analysis), and Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp.
579, 584–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that some fifty acts of mail fraud occurring
across thirteen months were insufficient to prove closed-ended continuity).
Some circuits have adopted bright-line rules requiring a minimum duration of
the racketeering activity for closed-ended continuity. See, e.g., Jackson v. BellSouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he substantial period of time
requirement for establishing closed-ended continuity cannot be met with allegations
of schemes lasting less than a year.”); First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood,
Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]his Court has never found a closed-ended
pattern where the predicate acts spanned fewer than two years.”); Hughes v. Consol-
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sought to create a flexible framework, and even recognized that “the
precise methods by which relatedness and continuity or its threat may
be proved, cannot be fixed in advance.”87
However, one of the issues that persists in the lower courts is not
a fruit of the Court’s lack of specific guidance in H.J. Inc.  This prob-
lem is instead rooted in some courts’ failure to properly apply the
unambiguous language of the Court in H.J. Inc. regarding what satisfies
“closed-ended continuity.”  Under the guise of applying H.J. Inc.’s
framework, but against its express direction, courts have effectively
reinstated the condemned single scheme exclusion to RICO’s pattern
requirement.
The Court in H.J. Inc. explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s rule
that multiple schemes were the sine qua non of continuity.88  But, nota-
bly absent from the Court’s opinion was any condemnation of the
approach that treated the presence of multiple schemes as a factor in
assessing continuity.89  In fact, the Court’s statement that the presence
of multiple schemes would “certainly be highly relevant” to the con-
tinuity analysis endorses such an approach.90  Many courts read this
language as the Court’s acceptance of a test which considers the num-
ber of schemes in determining whether a pattern exists.91  Conse-
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 611 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We hold that twelve months
is not a substantial period of time.”).
87 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243.
88 Id. at 236 (“We find no support in [the text and legislative history] for the
proposition . . . that predicate acts of racketeering may form a pattern only when they
are part of separate illegal schemes.”).
89 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. But see supra note 61 (explain- R
ing how Justice Scalia interpreted the Court’s declaration that “scheme” had no basis
in the text or legislative history to be a rejection of the concept of schemes “in all its
applications”).
90 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.
91 See, e.g., W. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 634 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he number of schemes alleged remains a useful consideration.” (cit-
ing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240)); Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 18
(1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact that a defendant has been involved in only one scheme
with a singular objective and a closed group of targeted victims . . . strikes us as ‘highly
relevant.’” (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240)); U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch
Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[The Supreme Court’s decision in H.J.
Inc.] does not mean that the fact that there is only one scheme involved is of no
consequence to the ‘pattern’ determination.”); Sutherland v. O’Malley, 882 F.2d
1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989) (“While a RICO pattern can be established, in some cir-
cumstances, by proof of a single scheme, it is not irrelevant, in analyzing the con-
tinuity requirement, that there is only one scheme.”). But see Fleet Credit Corp. v.
Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 446 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Court [in H.J. Inc.] did not allude to
the other Morgan factors, such as the number of victims or the variety of the acts.
H.J.’s approach leads to the conclusion that a plaintiff who alleges a high number of
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quently, these courts still consider whether the racketeering activity
formed merely a single scheme or multiple schemes in analyzing the
continuity prong.
Though consideration of the presence of multiple schemes as
one of multiple factors is not per se improper,92 in some instances
doing so contravenes the express guidance of H.J. Inc.  Several lower
courts fixate on the “highly relevant” language to exclude from
RICO’s reach certain cases that meet the explicit H.J. Inc. standard for
closed-ended continuity. H.J. Inc. held that continuity over a closed
period of time may be demonstrated by showing “a series of related
predicates extending over a substantial period of time.”93  This
includes “predicates within a single scheme that were related and that
amounted to . . . continued criminal activity.”94  Despite this explicit
language, several courts, especially within the D.C. Circuit, have dis-
missed cases that have sufficient duration to meet the closed-ended
standard95 by relying heavily on the absence of “multiple schemes.”96
related predicate acts committed over a substantial period of time establishes that
those acts amount to continued criminal activity, irrespective of the other Roeder/Mor-
gan factors.” (citation omitted)); Mgmt. Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie
& Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e believe that the factors identified in
Morgan—with the exception of our focus on the presence of separate schemes—are
still useful in analyzing the pattern element.”).
92 But see infra notes 120–123 (explaining the argument that consideration of the R
presence or absence of multiple schemes was always improper, both before and after
H.J. Inc., based on the text and legislative history of RICO).
93 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
94 Id. at 237.
95 This Note does not argue a bright-line period of time exists that satisfies H.J.
Inc.’s standard of “substantial period of time.”  Any true bright-line rule would inter-
fere with the flexibility the Court desired to achieve.  But, it does argue that (a) the
time periods over which several of these “single scheme” exclusion cases extended are
substantial; and (b) regardless of this, the courts engaging in this analysis are placing
far too much weight on the absence of multiple schemes, such that the effective result
is a single scheme exclusion.
96 See, e.g., W. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 635 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (holding that a single scheme of racketeering activity across eight years was
insufficient to prove continuity); GE Inv. Private Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247
F.3d 543, 549–51 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding several acts of fraud across eighteen months
designed to inflate company value before selling it to be insufficient for continuity
and stating that “[w]here the fraudulent conduct is part of the sale of a single enter-
prise, the fraud has a built-in ending point, and the case does not present the neces-
sary threat of long-term, continued criminal activity”); Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.),
Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 17–21 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that a single scheme of seventeen acts
of racketeering across 21 months is insufficient for continuity and arguing that the
Court’s emphasis on temporal factors “did not mean that other considerations were
to be entirely ignored”); Edmonson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48
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In performing their analysis of the closed-ended continuity, these
courts regularly pay lip service to H.J. Inc.’s determination that a series
of related acts over a substantial period of time is sufficient for closed-
ended continuity.97  But, instead of discussing whether the facts show
a series of predicate acts occurring over a substantial period of time,
these courts instead consider a range of factors, often giving inordi-
nate weight to the absence of multiple schemes.
Some of these cases are objectionable merely because of the
amount of weight they place on the absence of multiple schemes.  For
example, in Anheuser Busch, it is not entirely clear that seventeen
months of racketeering activity would have met the Court’s standard
of “a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of
time.”98  However, the court did not explore this possibility, and in
fact, did not even refer to this language.99  Other cases are more
troublesome, as they both employ a test that ignores the standard cre-
F.3d 1260, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that fifteen predicate acts across three years
had insufficient continuity and claiming that “the combination of these factors (single
scheme, single injury, and few victims) makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to
state a RICO claim”); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 133–35 (6th Cir. 1994)
(finding several acts of fraud, extortion, and obstruction of justice across seventeen
months insufficient because it involved only “a single victim and a single scheme for a
single purpose”); U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1266–69
(7th Cir. 1990) (finding seventeen months of mail and wire fraud offenses insufficient
for a “pattern” because of the character of the offenses and the absence of multiple
schemes); Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 683–85 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding
that several acts of commercial fraud across a year were insufficient to meet the con-
tinuity bar because the actions “were narrowly directed towards a single fraudulent
goal” and “involved a limited purpose”); Harpole Architects, P.C. v. Barlow, 668 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that a series of related acts across three
years had insufficient continuity because they formed a “single scheme” and had only
one victim); Lopez v. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc.,
657 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that even if the defendant’s alleged
scheme was construed to have lasted twenty four months, this “one scheme, spanning
about two years, with only four identified victims” did not have the requisite con-
tinuity); Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 4, 11 (D.D.C.
1998) (finding a single scheme of racketeering with one victim that continued for two
years to have insufficient continuity).
97 See, e.g., GE Inv., 247 F.3d at 549; Efron, 223 F.3d at 15–16; Vemco, 23 F.3d at
134. But see Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 636 (only mentioning the “substantial period
of time” standard briefly when disposing of the plaintiff’s argument and immediately
redirecting attention to the Edmonson factors); Edmonson, 48 F.3d at 1264–65 (making
no mention of H.J. Inc.’s standard for closed-ended continuity, but instead stating
that “[t]he Court in H.J. offered few clues about what characteristics of a closed
period would establish the requisite pattern”).
98 See supra note 86 (discussing the uncertainty in analysis of a “substantial”
period of time).
99 Anheuser-Busch, 911 F.2d at 1266–69.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL405.txt unknown Seq: 21 22-APR-13 11:09
2013] resurrection  of  s ingle  scheme  exclusion  to  rico 2011
ated by H.J. Inc. and reach a result that a proper application of H.J.
Inc.’s test would contradict.
The most frequently cited case in this line of cases is Edmonson &
Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n.100 Edmonson is the defibrillator
that revived the “single scheme” exclusion, as almost every case that
insulates single schemes from the reach of RICO cites it.101  In Edmon-
son, the plaintiff’s plan to purchase an apartment complex was
thwarted by a tenants’ association through alleged tortious interfer-
ence with contract, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution over a
span of three years.102  At issue was whether the conduct formed a
pattern for purposes of RICO.  The court began its analysis by citing
H.J. Inc. for the proposition that Congress intended for courts to take
a “natural and commonsense approach to RICO’s pattern ele-
ment.”103  The court then purported to apply a multi-factor test, but
noted that cases can arise in which “some factors will weigh so strongly
in one direction as to be dispositive.”104  The court went on to dismiss
the RICO claim, finding that “the combination of these factors (single
scheme, single injury, and few victims) makes it virtually impossible
for plaintiffs to state a RICO claim.”105  Conspicuously absent from the
court’s reasoning was any analysis of whether the plaintiff had alleged
a series of acts continuing over a substantial period of time.  Thus, the
Edmonson court breathed life back into the single scheme exclusion to
RICO’s pattern requirement.
If Edmonson revived the single scheme exclusion, Western Associates
rehabilitated it to its former strength.106  In Western Associates, the
plaintiff created a partnership to develop, own, manage, and ulti-
mately dispose of a mixed-use property in downtown Washington,
100 48 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
101 See, e.g., Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 633; Efron, 223 F.3d at 19; Lopez, 657 F.
Supp. 2d at 111.
102 Edmonson, 48 F.3d at 1262–64.
103 Id. at 1264.  This broad, capacious language from the Court’s decision in H.J.
Inc. regularly serves as the leaping-off point for analysis in cases that appear to re-
impose the single scheme exclusion. See, e.g., Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 633 (quoting
H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237).
104 Edmonson, 48 F.3d at 1265.  Ironically, the six-factor test that Edmonson cited,
and purported to apply, made no mention whatsoever of the relevance of single or
multiple schemes. Id. (noting that the Third Circuit’s test considers “the number of
unlawful acts, the length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity of
the acts, the number of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the character of the
unlawful activity” (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1411–13
(3d Cir. 1991))).
105 Id.
106 Western Assocs., 235 F.3d 629 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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D.C.  The plaintiff filed suit against Market Associates (“Market”), his
business partner in the venture, alleging that Market “repeatedly vio-
lated partnership agreements, transmitted fraudulent accounting
statements, and stole the value of [plaintiff’s] partnership interest.”107
The core of the allegations was that Market fraudulently misrepre-
sented costs, profits, and economic viability, costing the plaintiff $89
million in damages.108  The plaintiff filed a RICO suit alleging racke-
teering activity that spanned across a period of eight years,109 notably
even longer than the six-year single scheme of racketeering activity
found to satisfy closed-ended continuity in H.J. Inc.110
The court, citing Edmonson, found that the claim must fail
because the plaintiff only alleged a single scheme, a single injury, and
few victims.111  Though it recognized the Supreme Court declared
continuity to be “centrally a temporal concept,”112 the court nonethe-
less found the eight-year time period not dispositive.  The court then
cautioned against “finding continuity too easily”113 in the context of
wire and mail fraud cases because “[it is] the unusual fraud that does
not enlist the mails and wires in its service at least twice.”114  Finally,
the court closed by pronouncing, despite appearance to the contrary,
that it was not creating a bright-line rule against single schemes.115
Though not all D.C. Circuit cases follow Edmonson and Western
Associates,116 several district court cases in D.C. have followed suit on
107 Id. at 631.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 250 (1989).
111 Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 636.
112 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
113 Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 636–37 (quoting Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.),
Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2000)).
114 Id. at 637 (quoting Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2000)).
115 Id. at 637 (“Neither the instant case nor Edmonson establishes a per se rule for
RICO pattern analysis.”).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1020–21 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (find-
ing that a drug distribution ring of dealing spanning for sixteen months lasted a “sub-
stantial period of time” and therefore satisfied the closed-ended continuity standard);
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per-
forming only a cursory analysis of H.J. Inc.’s standard for a pattern and not citing
Western Associates or Edmonson in its analysis).  However, neither of these cases explic-
itly or implicitly rejected the Edmonson analysis, and subsequent cases continue to cite
Edmonson and Western Associates when performing in-depth analyses of the pattern ele-
ment. See, e.g., Feld Entm’t, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying the Edmonson test and finding that
the 1000 alleged predicate acts across eight years and multiple victims and injuries
distinguish the case from Edmonson and Western Associates).
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the recreation of an exclusion of single schemes from the reach of
RICO.117  These courts, applying the six-factor test set forth in Edmon-
son, tend not to cite the more explicit language of H.J. Inc. (that a
series of related acts over a substantial period of time is sufficient to
form a pattern)118 and give disproportionate at least, and dispositive
at most, weight to the absence of multiple schemes.  These courts jus-
tify their restrictive analysis of the pattern element in a familiar way: by
voicing a preference against interpreting mail and wire fraud to be
patterns.119
Several concerns arise from the practice of excluding cases from
RICO because they lack “multiple schemes.”  First, the plain text of
RICO makes no reference to the relevance of multiple schemes.120
The plain meaning of the term “pattern” does not connote a require-
ment of separate and distinct schemes.121  In other contexts, the
117 See, e.g., Harpole Architects, P.C. v. Barlow, 668 F. Supp. 2d 68, 74–75 (D.D.C.
2009) (finding that “a single series of acts over three years” was insufficient to satisfy
the pattern requirement as set forth Edmonson); Lopez v. Council on American-
Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D.D.C. 2009) (find-
ing “one scheme, spanning about two years, with only four identified victims” to lack
the requisite continuity under D.C. Circuit precedent); Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 4, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that six predicate acts across
two years in furtherance of a single scheme of using the regulatory and disciplinary
authority of the National Association of Securities Dealers to harm the plaintiff’s busi-
ness and reputation lacked the requisite continuity required by Edmonson).
118 Neither Harpole, Lopez, nor Zandford makes any reference whatsoever to the
Supreme Court’s language that “a series of related predicates extending over a sub-
stantial period of time” demonstrates closed-ended continuity.
119 See, e.g., Lopez, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (“RICO claims premised on mail or wire
fraud must be particularly scrutinized because of the relative ease with which a plain-
tiff may mold a RICO pattern from allegations that, upon closer scrutiny, do not sup-
port it.” (citing Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 637)).
120 See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 (1989) (noting that the
concept of a scheme “appears nowhere in the language or legislative history of the
Act”); see also United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 n.16 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he
multiple scheme requirement is not grounded in the statutory language of RICO.”).
121 A “pattern” is defined as “a regular and intelligible form or sequence discerni-
ble in the way in which something happens or is done.” OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/pattern (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
Absent from this definition is any indication, explicit or implicit, that multiple
“schemes” could be relevant in any way.  If anything, multiple schemes would detract
from the presence of a pattern, as the “regular and intelligible form or sequence”
would become less and less discernible as the number of schemes grew. See infra note
129.  Several attempts by the judiciary have been made to articulate exactly what the
plain meaning of a pattern is. See, e.g., Apparel Art Int’l, Inc. v. Jacobson, 967 F.2d
720, 722 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, C.J.) (“[T]here are many words best defined by, say,
pointing to examples (consider the color ‘red’) or simply by using them in different
relevant contexts.  And, it sometimes helps more to say what lies beyond a word’s
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Court has consistently rejected attempts by the lower courts to read
into RICO limitations that do not derive from its language.122  Fur-
ther, no basis for the multiple schemes requirement can be found in
the legislative history of RICO.123
Given the complete absence of “scheme” in the text and legisla-
tive history of RICO, the argument could be made that consideration
of the presence of multiple schemes is per se improper, both before
and after H.J. Inc.  However, given the Court’s declaration that the
presence of multiple schemes could be “highly relevant”124 to the con-
tinuity inquiry, this is a difficult argument.  This language, paired with
H.J. Inc.’s failure to reject multi-factor approaches that considered the
presence of multiple schemes, can reasonably be interpreted as an
implicit endorsement of the general practice of considering the pres-
ence of multiple schemes in assessing continuity.
However, the problem is that cases that meet the Court’s explicit
standard for closed-ended continuity are being dismissed based on
H.J. Inc.’s less-specific, arguably vacuous language.  To whatever
extent multiple schemes are “highly relevant” to the continuity
inquiry, the absence of multiple schemes ought not result in dis-
missing a case presenting “a series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time.”125  The Court’s intention to create
conceptual scope than to provide an alternative verbal formulation of what lies
within.”); Benard v. Hoff, 727 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D. Md. 1989) (“The temptation thus
is to yield to a criterion that is based on ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it,’ but that can hardly be
useful in measuring the adequacy of a complaint.  In a common sense understanding,
one recognizes a pattern on wallpaper, for example, which is being unrolled, when he
has seen enough to discern repetition and to anticipate similar images on the paper
were it to be unrolled further. . . . Pattern in th[is] example[ ] is thus a relationship of
multiple images or points from which one can discern a larger order of repetition or
predict that which is yet undefined.”).  Professor Robert Blakey, the architect of
RICO, explained vividly the intuitive nature of the word pattern: “[A]ny aficionado of
football who watched Joe Montana and John Elway pass knew, without having to have
it explained to him or her, that Montana passed in a ‘pattern,’ while Elway improvised
most of the time.”  G. Robert Blakey, Time Bars: RICO—Criminal and Civil—Federal and
State, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
122 See supra note 48.
123 See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 986 (“The multiple scheme requirement also R
finds no support in [RICO’s] legislative history.”); Sally P. Everett Williamson, RICO’s
Pattern of Racketeering Activity and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX Co., Inc.: Relationship and
Continuity in the Circuit Courts, 8 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 609, 629 (1989) (“The difficulty
to the plaintiff in having to allege and prove multiple schemes of activity would defeat
Congress’ intent in enacting RICO.”).
124 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.
125 Id. at 230.
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a “natural and commonsense”126 framework for the pattern element
was not intended to give the lower courts carte blanche to devise their
own analyses for the pattern element.  Even if the Court’s test merely
directed that “life is a fountain,” as Justice Scalia suggested,127 this
would presumably still preclude the lower courts from concluding
that “life is a highway.”
Though the Court assuredly did intend a flexible approach, it
intended it to be flexible within the bounds of the framework it created.
Applying a framework other than that of the Court is itself questiona-
ble behavior for lower courts to engage in,128 but certainly applying its
own framework in a way that defies the plain guidance of the Court is
inappropriate.
Moreover, from a practical perspective, the “multiple schemes”
requirement, and even the consideration of multiple schemes, is illogical.
In the context of the framework the Court created, requiring multiple
schemes for a pattern would have the enigmatic effect of excluding all
cases.  If there were similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
etc., the requirement of multiple schemes under the continuity prong
would exclude the case.  But, if there were separate victims, partici-
pants, purposes, etc., then the facts would no longer satisfy the rela-
tionship prong.129  The existence of this anomaly does not cease to
126 Id. at 237.
127 Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128 The Seventh and D.C. Circuits continue to apply multi-factor tests from prior
to H.J. Inc. in analyzing closed-ended continuity. See supra note 85.  These R
frameworks differ from the Court’s analysis in H.J. Inc. both in their overvaluation of
factors which the court in H.J. Inc. did not include in its explicit framework (such as
separate schemes, number of victims, distinctness of injuries) and their undervalua-
tion of factors that the Court did explicitly include (that a series of related acts over a
substantial period of time is sufficient).  Given that the Supreme Court intended a
“flexible,” “natural and commonsense” approach to RICO’s pattern element, infusing
other factors into the analysis—even those to which the Court did not specifically
refer—does not seem improper. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237, 238.  But, the Court’s
statement that a series of related acts over a substantial period of time is sufficient for
closed-ended continuity would seem to qualify as part of its “holding.” See, e.g.,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “holding” as a “court’s determi-
nation of a matter of law pivotal to its decision”); Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino
P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he holding of a case
includes, besides the facts and the outcome, the reasoning essential to that out-
come.”).  Consequently, courts that have failed to consider this component in their
analysis, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, are violating the principle of stare R
decisis.
129 See Lewis v. Sporck, 646 F. Supp. 574, 581 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (“[The] defend-
ants’ theory [that multiple fraudulent efforts are required] would force plaintiff to
steer between the Scylla of pleading multiple ‘fraudulent efforts’ and the Charybdis of
pleading ‘related, non-isolated’ criminal acts.”); Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 987 R
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exist because the Edmonson and Western Associates courts insist that they
are not applying a bright-line rule.130  This claim rings hollow against
the backdrop of cases involving over eight years of racketeering
activity.
Finally, as the Court recognized in H.J. Inc., introducing the con-
cept of a scheme into an already confusing analysis has the added
effect of further muddying the water with more ambiguous terminol-
ogy.131  The concept of a scheme is exceedingly vague, and very sus-
ceptible to judicial stretching or contracting to fit a gut instinct about
if the case should or should not be a RICO one.132  Moreover, the
practical consequence of the D.C. Circuit’s emphasis on multiple
schemes has been to force plaintiffs to attempt to plead multiple
schemes, not a pattern.133  Forcing plaintiffs to jump through hoops
to specifically plead something that the Court unmistakably found
unnecessary to the presence of a pattern could not be what the Court
in H.J. Inc. intended.
(“Continuity and relationship, however, are potentially mutually exclusive concepts
under a multiple scheme test.  To the extent that a complaint alleges multiple
schemes, it becomes more difficult to allege the requisite ‘relationship’ factor; how-
ever, when a close relationship between predicates is alleged, the events are more
prone to be characterized as merely a single scheme.”); Huestis, supra note 26, at 646 R
(arguing that the approach requiring multiple schemes “strains the balance created
by the concepts of relationship and continuity and, in fact, often places them in direct
tension”).
130 See Edmonson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Assoc., 48 F.3d 1260, 1265
(D.C. Cir. 1995); W. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 637
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
131 See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241 n.3 (noting that scheme is “hardly a self-defining
term” and expressing the desire to avoid “introducing a new and perhaps more amor-
phous concept into the analysis” (citing Barticheck v. Fid. Union Bank/First Nat’l
State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987))).
132 See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 984 (“[Under the multiple scheme require-
ment] the application of RICO then turns on how a court chooses to characterize the
crime or crimes at issue.  Presumably, ‘good’ RICO cases would be viewed as multiple
schemes, and ‘bad’ RICO cases would be rejected as ‘mere’ single schemes.  A stan-
dard so prone to result-oriented decisions is no standard at all.”).
133 See, e.g., Western Assocs., 235 F.3d at 631–32 (explaining how after the plaintiff’s
original pleading was amended, they simply replead the same facts but structured
them in four separate schemes); Feld Entm’t, Inc. v. Am. Soc. for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288, 311–12 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing how plain-
tiffs argued that the amended complaint alleged three separate schemes while the
defendants argued the activities amounted to one overarching scheme); see also Gold-
smith, supra note 26, at 988 (“RICO defendants are motivated to generalize the allega- R
tions against them, and plaintiffs artificially attempt to splinter each claim into a
multiplicity of schemes.”).
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The justification most commonly given for the single scheme
exclusion is that it effectuates a preference “against finding continuity
too easily in the context of a single dishonest undertaking involving
mail or wire fraud . . . .”134  Courts have expressed concern that
“[v]irtually every garden-variety fraud is accomplished through a
series of wire or mail fraud acts that are ‘related’ by purpose and
spread over a period of at least several months.”135  Though the
Supreme Court was undoubtedly aware of concerns about RICO’s
extraordinary breadth at the time of H.J. Inc.,136 no part of its test for
closed-ended continuity accounts for this factor.  Had the Court
intended to set a loftier bar for RICO suits predicated on mail and
wire fraud cases, the framework set forth in H.J. Inc. certainly would
have mentioned it.  Judicial attempts to circumscribe RICO’s applica-
tion in typical business disputes and fraud cases have been addressed
by the Supreme Court several times, and the Court has resoundingly
rejected each of them.137
To reiterate, the consideration of multiple schemes is not per se
wrong, and many courts that consider this factor in their analysis do so
faithfully to H.J. Inc.138  What is problematic is the effective re-imposi-
134 Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2000); see also GE
Inv. Private Placement Partners v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2001) (“We are
‘cautious about basing a RICO claim on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud because
it will be the unusual fraud that does not enlist the mails and wires in its service at
least twice.’” (quoting Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2000)));
U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“Mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique among the various sorts of ‘racketeer-
ing activity’ possible under RICO in that the existence of a multiplicity of predicate
acts . . . may be no indication of the requisite continuity of the underlying fraudulent
activity.” (emphasis added) (quoting Sutherland v. O’Malley, 882 F.2d 1196, 1205 n.8
(7th Cir. 1989))); Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1989) (“If
the pattern requirement has any force whatsoever, it is to prevent this type of ordinary
commercial fraud from being transformed into a federal RICO claim.”).
135 U.S. Textiles, 911 F.2d at 1268 (citation omitted).
136 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (“We . . . recognize
that, in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors. . . . The ‘extraordinary’ uses to which civil
RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate
offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud . . . .”).
137 See supra note 48 (listing cases rejecting unprincipled limitations to RICO not R
inhering in its text).
138 See, e.g., Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calcio-CBCC v. Applied Indus.
Materials Corp., Nos. 01-646, 01-2678, 2012 WL 3553750, at *12 (D.D.C. 2012) (find-
ing that a single scheme of price-fixing and elimination of competition that featured
fifty-seven predicate offenses across ten years was sufficient to plead the pattern
requirement); Feld Entm’t Inc. v. Am. Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
873 F. Supp. 2d 288, 313 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying the Edmonson test and finding that
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tion of the multiple schemes requirement, especially when it excludes
from RICO’s reach cases that satisfy the express language of H.J. Inc.
That this multiple schemes requirement comes cloaked in the
broader language of H.J. Inc. does not make it any more acceptable.
Accordingly, courts that continue to impose the multiple schemes
requirement on RICO’s pattern requirement should alter their
approach to comply with the letter and spirit of the Court’s opinion in
H.J. Inc.  The Court set forth a framework to bring consistency to
RICO’s pattern analysis.  That framework established that predicate
acts extending over a substantial period of time are sufficient to show
closed-ended continuity.  Though this standard may make courts that
are concerned with RICO’s applicability to run-of-the-mill fraud cases
uncomfortable, it is not their province to circumvent the Court’s
explicit direction to achieve their desired end. H.J. Inc. set forth a
flexible, malleable framework for analysis that left ample wiggle room
for courts to include or remove cases from RICO’s reach.  Inconsisten-
cies and reasonable disagreement among the lower courts will inevita-
bly persist as to some components of the pattern analysis,139 purely as
a function of this type of standard-based, rather than rule-based,
framework.  However, failing to consider the Court’s standard and giv-
ing near dispositive weight to a factor the Court rejected fall beyond
reasonable disagreement.
An alternative solution, given the continuity of “continuity” con-
fusion in the lower courts,140 would be for the Court to grant certio-
rari on another RICO pattern case and adjust or replace its previous
guidance from H.J. Inc.  Clarifying a previous discussion of an element
of RICO is not something the Roberts Court is averse to doing, as in
2006 it took up Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.141 to adjust the proxi-
mate cause requirement for RICO that it had previously delineated,142
and in 2009 it took up Boyle v. United States143 to refine its analysis of
the “enterprise” element.144  Reexamining the pattern requirement of
RICO would give the Court an opportunity to construct a more easily
the 1000 alleged predicate acts across eight years and multiple victims and injuries
distinguish the case from Edmonson and Western Associates).
139 See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement in the R
lower courts regarding what factors to consider for the continuity prong and what
period of time is “substantial” enough to satisfy closed-ended continuity).
140 See supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text (discussing problems in the R
lower courts in analyzing the continuity prong of the “pattern” analysis).
141 547 U.S. 451 (2006).
142 Id. at 461.
143 556 U.S. 938 (2009).
144 Id. at 947–49 (expanding upon United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981),
and holding that, while an enterprise must have some ascertainable “structure,” there
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applicable standard, or to clarify the existing standards, with the
added benefit of twenty-three years of hindsight since H.J. Inc.  That
said, it could also disrupt whatever development of the “continuity
plus relationship” standard has transpired since H.J. Inc.  Further-
more, given the intuitive and abstract meaning of a “pattern,”145 judi-
cial attempts to formulate a more precise definition may simply be a
fool’s errand.
Specifying what exactly a “pattern” is, and rejecting any exclusion
based on a single scheme, remains a task better suited for Congress
than the courts.146  The Court in H.J. Inc. invited this type of interces-
sion,147 but ensuing attempts to refine or reform RICO floundered.148
Should Congress wish to clarify what a “pattern” requires in a mean-
ingful way, consulting the “little RICO” statutes of states149 could be of
assistance.  While the majority of “little RICO” statutes do not define
“pattern” in a way that could solve the inconsistencies in federal RICO
jurisprudence,150 several states’ definitions codify a more precise defi-
need not be any structural attributes beyond those inherent in the language of
RICO).
145 See supra note 121. R
146 Advising a more appropriate statutory definition for a “pattern of racketeering
activity” is beyond the scope of this Note.
147 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989) (“The development of these concepts must await
future cases, absent a decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as
to the Act’s intended scope.” (emphasis added)).
148 See Barsoomian, supra note 26, at 941–45 (discussing the provisions of the R
RICO Reform Act of 1989 and RICO Amendments Act of 1990).
149 Thirty-five United States jurisdictions now have “little RICO” statutes. See
Blakey, supra note 121 (listing the states that have adopted RICO analog statutes).
150 The bulk of “little RICO” statutes utilize the concept of a “pattern.”  These
statutes often include in their definitional section that a “pattern” requires some rela-
tionship between the acts, and that the acts must have occurred within a certain time
period of one another, but rarely address what degree of continuity the predicate acts
must have. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2012)
(requiring two incidents that are not isolated events that have “the same or a similar
purpose, result, principals, victims, or methods of commission”); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-17-103(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (requiring two acts of racketeering
activity related to the conduct of the enterprise within ten years of one another);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (requiring at least two
incidents that are related and not isolated occurring within five years of one another);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012) (requiring at least two inci-
dents that are related and occurring within five years of one another); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-7803(d) (2004) (requiring at least two related incidents that are not iso-
lated events within five years of one another).  Congressional adoption of a definition
similar to these would provide little assistance to courts in assessing what degree of
continuity a “pattern” requires.
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nition in a way that comports with federal RICO’s “relationship plus
continuity” aim.151
CONCLUSION
The meaning of RICO’s “pattern of racketeering activity” require-
ment has been notoriously difficult to establish. Sedima’s reference to
“continuity plus relationship” spawned deep disagreement in the
lower courts as to what constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity.”
Though H.J. Inc.’s guidance did solve some of the inconsistencies in
the lower courts, other differences persist because of the flexible
nature of the direction the Court provided.  But, if there was one
thing that the Court in H.J. Inc. was clear about, it was the rejection of
the multiple schemes requirement.  All nine members of the Court
rejected the requirement of multiple schemes for a pattern to be pre-
sent.  Though the Court noted that the presence of multiple schemes
was not irrelevant to the pattern inquiry, it set forth a framework that
 Several “little RICO” statutes have omitted the term “pattern,” instead just dis-
cussing whether “racketeering” or “racketeering activity” was present. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312(B) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (“A person commits illegally con-
ducting an enterprise if such person is employed by or associated with any enterprise
and conducts such enterprise’s affairs through racketeering or participates directly or
indirectly in the conduct of any enterprise that the person knows is being conducted
through racketeering.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 842-2 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp.
2011) (omitting the term pattern, using simply “racketeering activity”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 207.400 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2011) (same).  Congressional
removal of the term “pattern” would seem to be jumping out of the frying pan and
into the fire, as finding what frequency and duration of predicate acts constitute
“racketeering activity” would likely be even more difficult.
151 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1502(5) (2007) (requiring two or more inci-
dents of racketeering activity within ten years that are related to the affairs of the
enterprise but “not so closely related to each other and connected in point of time
and place that they constitute a single event”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.902 (West 2009
& Supp. 2012) (defining “pattern” as three or more criminal acts within ten years that
“are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point of time
or circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal offense”); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 460.10(4) (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2012) (defining pattern as three or more
criminal acts within ten years that are “neither isolated incidents, nor so closely
related and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to consti-
tute a criminal offense or criminal transaction”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.31(E)
(LexisNexis 2010) (defining “[p]attern of corrupt activity” to mean two or more inci-
dents of corrupt activity, related to the same enterprise, that are not isolated and are
“not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they consti-
tute a single event”).  These definitions of a “pattern” align better with the intuitive
meaning of a pattern, as they recognize that a single event featuring multiple crimes
could not form a pattern, but do not exclude the possibility that a single criminal
scheme could. See supra note 121. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL405.txt unknown Seq: 31 22-APR-13 11:09
2013] resurrection  of  s ingle  scheme  exclusion  to  rico 2021
gave more explicit guidelines as to what did constitute a pattern.  In
particular, the Court held that the continuity prong of the pattern
analysis may be proven by a showing of a series of predicates
extending over a substantial period of time.
Fixating their analysis on the more nebulous components of the
Court’s opinion, lower courts are circumventing the explicit language
of the Court and have effectively recreated a single scheme exclusion
to RICO’s pattern requirement.  The effect has been to exclude from
RICO’s grasp cases that satisfy its text, explicated by the Court in H.J.
Inc.  These attempts are primarily motivated by a desire to exclude
business fraud cases from RICO.  However, the Court has uniformly
rejected similar limitations on RICO’s applicability not derived from
its text.  Moreover, the multiple schemes requirement is without basis
in RICO’s text, legislative history, or the intuitive meaning of a “pat-
tern.”  In sum, lower courts that are giving excessive weight to the
absence of multiple schemes should jettison this practice to give a
more faithful application to the Court’s word in H.J. Inc.
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